impact, where the Charter has resulted in concrete reforms to EU and national law; (2) indirect impact, where the Charter has steered the development of other rules and possibly precipitated a reconsideration of earlier hierarchies; and (3) shadow effect, where the Charter itself is not cited but the decision can be understood against the backcloth of the Charter. Second, the paper will turn to examine, 'crisis-related' situations where the Charter has, so far, had little impact, namely the reforms to national labour law required by the troika in the wake of the financial crisis (section C). It will then consider whether the Charter might apply to measures adopted under the ESM and TSCG. Finally, it will examine how the Court might apply the Charter when it eventually comes to hear a challenge to a national reform under the Charter. Section D concludes.
B.
The Ways in which the Charter's Presence has been felt in 'noncrisis' situations 1. The direct impact of the Charter
Striking down legislative acts of the EU institutions
With its decision in Kücükdeveci, 4 decided shortly after the Charter came into force, the Court made its intention plain: the Charter was going to change things, and change things it did, not only in respect of the facts of Kücükdeveci (on which see further below) but also in respect of the impact of the Charter on the EU institutions.
First, in Volker and Schecke 5 the Court struck down EU legislation, for the first time, 6 for its incompatibility with fundamental rights, and the Charter in particular. The case concerned an EU Regulation requiring individuals to agree that, in order to receive money from EU agricultural funds, their name, address and the amounts they receive had to be recorded on a publicly accessible website. In a robust retort to its critics that it doesn't take rights seriously, 7 the Court used the Charter to strike down the Regulation for its incompatibility with an individual's fundamental right to privacy, in part because the Council and Commission had failed to consider whether there were any less restrictive alternatives to achieve the objective of transparency.
Second, in Test-Achats 8 the Court also declared a provision of Directive 2004/113 on equal treatment between men and women in the access to, and supply of, goods and services to be incompatible with the Charter. Article 5(1) of the Directive laid down the principle of equal treatment; Article 5(2) allowed Member States to derogate from that principle to allow sex-based actuarial factors to calculate insurance premiums. The Court said that because Article 5(2) enabled the Member States 'to maintain without temporal limitation an exemption from the rule of unisex premiums and benefits, this works against the achievement of the objective of equal treatment ', 9 contrary to Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter. The Court therefore ruled that the derogation was invalid from 21 December 2012, the date when the Member States had to review their use of the derogation. The decision was met by a chorus of disapproval in those states, such as the UK, which have taken advantage of the derogation. 10 Yet the logic of the ruling is clear: sex-based actuarial factors are based on stereotypical assumptions which are incompatible with the case-by-case, meritbased approach that should be taken to decision-making.
Given that the Court has shown itself increasingly willing to strike down EU legislation for breach of the Charter, this means that pre-screening of draft legislation for its compatibility with the Charter has become all the more important. The Commission already does this 11 and is proud of its success.
It cites, by way of example, the approach it took in drawing up legislation on the use of security scanners for detecting unsafe objects carried by passenger at EU airports. It relates that
The preparatory phases leading to the adoption of this legislation took into account the impact of different policy options on fundamental rights so as to ensure that this legislation complies with the Charter. Member States and airports wishing to deploy security scanners must comply with minimum conditions set by the EU's new rules to safeguard fundamental rights. Most importantly, passengers will be entitled to opt out from the security scanner procedure and to be checked by alternative screening methods. Passengers must be informed of the possibility to opt out, of the scanner technology used and of the conditions associated with its use. In addition, detailed conditions are laid down to ensure that the right to the protection of personal data and private life is respected, for instance, the obligation that security scanners shall not store, retain, copy, print or retrieve images. As far as health considerations are concerned, only scanners that do not use ionising radiation are allowed as a method for screening persons. 
The Charter as the starting point for judicial analysis
The existence of the Charter has legitimised the Court's ability to refer to human rights when deciding cases. No longer is it constrained by having to argue that human rights are general principles of law which are inspired by the constitutional traditions of the Member States and by international treaties, especially the ECHR. 13 It now has its own catalogue of human rights which it will use as the starting point for its analysis. The Court said that it had to be assumed that the treatment of asylum seekers in all Member States complied with the requirements of the Charter, the Geneva Convention and the ECHR. 22 However, it added that if there were 'substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure' -as had been shown was the case in Greece 23 -resulting in inhuman or degrading treatment of asylum seekers transferred to Greece, that transfer would be incompatible with the Charter. 24 The UK therefore had to consider NS's application.
In DEB German law granted legal aid to both natural and legal persons but the conditions under which legal aid was granted to legal persons were more restrictive than those for natural persons. the Secretary of State accepts, in principle, that fundamental rights set out in the Charter can be relied on as against the UK, and submits that [Cranston J, the first instance judge] erred in holding otherwise. … The purpose of the Charter protocol is not to prevent the Charter from applying to the United Kingdom, but to explain its effect.
All this seems pretty conclusive: Protocol 30 is not (generally) an opt-out, a view that the Court seemed to confirm in NS, 28 as Saeedi became when it was referred to the Court, where it said 'Article 1(1) of Protocol (No.30) explains Article 51 of the Charter with regard to the scope thereof and does not intend to exempt the Republic of Poland or the United Kingdom from the obligation to comply with the provisions of the Charter or to prevent a court of one of those Member States from ensuring compliance with those provisions.'
The indirect impact of the Charter
While the direct impact of the Charter has been the most headline-grabbing, the Charter is also having an indirect effect. As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, when working conditions constitute an overriding reason relating to the public interest justifying a derogation from the freedom to provide services, they must no longer be interpreted strictly. In so far as the protection of workers is a matter which warrants protection under the Treaties themselves, it is not a simple derogation from a freedom, still less an unwritten exception inferred from case-law. To the extent that the new primary law framework provides for a mandatory high level of social protection, it authorises the Member States, for the purpose of safeguarding a certain level of social protection, to restrict a freedom, and to do so without European Union law's regarding it as something exceptional and, therefore, as warranting a strict interpretation.
This also seemed to be the view of Advocate General Trstenjak who forcefully argued in Commission v. Germany (occupational pensions) 34 that:
183. The approach adopted in Viking Line and Laval un Partneri, according to which [Union] fundamental social rights as such may not justify -having due regard to the principle of proportionality -a restriction on a fundamental freedom but that a written or unwritten ground of justification incorporated within that fundamental right must, in addition, always be found, sits uncomfortably alongside the principle of equal ranking for fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms.
184. Such an analytical approach suggests, in fact, the existence of a hierarchical relationship between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights in which fundamental rights are subordinated to fundamental freedoms and, consequently, may restrict fundamental freedoms only with the assistance of a written or unwritten ground of justification. ...
186. In my view, there is no such hierarchical relationship between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights.
So far these sorts of observations have not led to a dramatic change in approach by the Court. But they do set the mood music which the Court may eventually listen to, and heed.
More generally, the advent of the Charter appears to have given the Court of Justice more confidence to offer its views on human rights, even where its competence to do so might be questioned. So, for example, the Charter is clear that if there is no link with EU law, the Charter does not apply. 35 However, in Dereci the Court nevertheless made the rather surprising observation that:
... if the referring court considers, in the light of the circumstances of the disputes in the main proceedings, that the situation of the applicants in the main proceedings is covered by European Union law, it must examine whether the refusal of their right of residence undermines the right to respect for private and family life provided for in Article 7 of the Charter. On the other hand, if it takes the view that that situation is not covered by European Union law, it must undertake that examination in the light of Article 8(1) of the ECHR.'
While the last sentence of this quote is legally correct, since all EU Member States are signatories to the ECHR, the Court of Justice's competence to tell the national courts to conduct an examination in the light of EU law is far from clear.
The shadow effect of the Charter
The third impact of the Charter is a paradoxical one: there are cases where the Charter's name is not mentioned but the spirit of the Charter pervades the judgment. Ruiz Zambrano 36 is perhaps the best example of this. Mr Ruiz Zambrano was a Columbian national living in Belgium. He was a failed asylum seeker but with non-refoulement protection (ie non-return to a place of danger). While in Belgium, he and his Columbian wife had two children (Diego and Jessica) of Belgian nationality. The question for the Court was whether he could rely on rights laid down by EU law to prevent himself and thus his family from being deported from Belgium. The Court said that a refusal to grant Mr Ruiz Zambrano a residence permit would lead to a situation where those children, citizens of the Union, would have to leave the territory of the Union in order to accompany their parents. Similarly, if a work permit were not granted to Mr Ruiz Zambrano, he would risk not having sufficient resources to provide for himself and his family, which would also result in the children, citizens of the Union, having to leave the territory of the Union. In those circumstances, the Court concluded 'those citizens of the Union would, in fact, be unable to exercise the substance of the rights conferred on them by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union.'
In its short (seven substantive paragraph) judgment, the Court made no reference to human rights, despite the detailed human rights analysis contained in the Advocate General's Opinion. However, the Court has long recognised the right to family life as a fundamental right and this seems to have covertly shaped the Court's judgment. iii. Reduce the overall budgetary cost of health benefits schemes for government employees schemes (ADSE, ADM and SAD) lowering the employer's contribution and adjusting the scope of health benefits, with savings of EUR 100 million in 2012.
Cuts to public sector wages were made as a result, including the loss of the thirteenth and fourteenth month salary. In the light of the Court's increasingly expansive reading of the Charter outlined above, it was inevitable that trade unions would try to argue that the radical reforms to national labour law contravened the Charter. 43 This led to the reference in Sindicatos dos Bancários do Norte 44 which, inter alia, raised the question whether 'the salary cut made by the State, by means of the Lei do Orçamento de Estado para 2011, applicable only to persons employed in the public sector or by a public undertaking, contrary to the principle of prohibition of discrimination in that it discriminates on the basis of the public nature of the employment relationship?' There were further questions about the compatibility of the reforms with the Charter. For example, the third question said:
Must the right to working conditions that respect dignity, laid down in Article 31(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that it is unlawful to make salary cuts without the employee's consent, if the contract of employment is not first altered to that effect?
The fifth question was even more expansive:
As a salary cut is not the only possible measure and is not necessary and fundamental to the efforts to consolidate public finances in a serious economic and financial crisis in the country, is it contrary to the right laid down in Article 31(1) of the Charter of Fundamental declined to hear the reference, not because the national court had already ruled on some of the issues but because this was a matter of national law, not EU law: 48 9 Dans le cadre d'un renvoi préjudiciel au titre de l'article 267 TFUE, la Cour peut uniquement interpréter le droit de l'Union dans les limites des compétences attribuées à l'Union européenne….
10 S'agissant des exigences découlant de la protection des droits fondamentaux, il est de jurisprudence constante qu'elles lient les États membres dans tous les cas où ils sont appelés à appliquer le droit de l'Union (…).
11 Toutefois, il convient de rappeler que, aux termes de l'article 51, paragraphe 1, de la Charte, les dispositions de celle-ci s'adressent «aux États membres uniquement lorsqu'ils mettent en oeuvre le droit de l'Union» et que, en vertu de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, TUE, qui attribue une valeur contraignante à la Charte, celle-ci ne crée aucune compétence nouvelle pour l'Union et ne modifie pas les compétences de cette dernière (…).
12 Or, malgré les doutes exprimés par la juridiction de renvoi quant à la conformité de la loi de finances pour 2011 avec les principes et les objectifs consacrés par les traités, la décision de renvoi ne contient aucun élément concret permettant de considérer que ladite loi vise à mettre en oeuvre le droit de l'Union.
The Court has also refused to hear references from Romania about reforms to Romanian labour law. For example, in Case C-434/11 Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor, the Court refused to hear a challenge to 45 50 It may be that an inadequately drafted order for reference, which failed to make express the links between the national reforms and bailout conditionality, gave the Court an escape route from having to decide difficult cases. 51 However, these decisions should not be seen in isolation, as the next section demonstrates.
The application of the Charter to the ESM Treaty and the TCSG
As we saw in the introduction, in Pringle the Court of Justice made clear that the conclusion of the European Stability Mechanism Treaty did not infringe the principle of effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the Charter because 'the Member States are not implementing Union law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, when they establish a stability mechanism such as the ESM where the [TEU and TFEU] do not confer any specific competence on the Union to do so'. For similar reasons it could be argued that the conclusion of the TSCG did not infringe the Charter because the Member States are not implementing Union law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter.
However, the TSCG is different to the ESM because, with the exception of the debt brake, the content of the fiscal compact part of the TSCG largely overlaps with the content of the 'six pack' rules (five regulations and one directive) which are part of EU law. Further, the link with the EU 49 According to Raluca Dimitriu, writing for the European Labour law network (http://www.labourlawnetwork.eu/national_labour_law/legislative_developments/prm/109/v__detail/id__11 08/category__29/size__1/index.html), the law provided for: -A reduction of 25 per cent of the monthly salaries/military payments/other payments and other salary-related rights in the public sector -A reduction of 15 per cent in unemployment payments and in the obligations of the state as a result of laying-off employees through collective dismissals -A reduction of 15 per cent of the pensions, to be paid or currently being paid -The elimination of the occupational pensions of magistrates (which are not based on a contribution system). These measures were temporary; provision is now being made to restore salaries to previous levels (http://www.labourlawnetwork.eu/national_labour_law/legislative_developments/prm/109/v__detail/id__22 15/category__29/size__1/index.html). The reduction in salaries was challenged, inter alia, in the Romanian Constitutional Court which decided in its decisions Nos. 871, 872, 873 and 874/2010 that the decrease in public sector salaries was constitutional so long as it was temporary and justified by exceptional circumstances, namely a threat to the economic stability of the country. The Constitutional Court considered that the reduction of the monthly salaries/military payments/other payments by 25 per cent has been imposed to cut public expenditure, thus safeguarding national security which included social and economic security. During the 99th Conference of the International Labour Organisation, several important union confederations (Cartel Alfa) filed a complaint against the Romanian Government because of the salary cuts. Treaties is much stronger (especially bearing in mind the commitment in Article 16 of incorporating the substance of the TSCG into the legal framework of the Union), with the TSCG being hierarchically inferior to the EU Treaties, including the Charter. Article 2(2) TSCG provides:
This Treaty shall apply insofar as it is compatible with the Treaties on which the European Union is founded and with European Union law'.
This might suggest that acts taken under the TSCG should be read subject to the Charter (which they would be if they were taken under the six pack which is part of EU law). And even if this analysis is incorrect, then the EU institutions which are 'borrowed' under both the ESM and TSCG, especially the Commission and the ECB, must surely need to act in compliance with the Charter since the Charter is addressed to the EU institutions. 
Effect of non-application of the Charter
While the Court's refusal to engage with the Charter in respect of 'crisis' measures may be the result of a pragmatic decision to ensure the troika negotiators have a free hand to deliver what they perceive to be in a country's best interest, it overlooks the fact that the states affected by conditionality are all signatories to other international standards with their own review bodies, notably the ILO and the European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR). The ECSR is a body of the Council of Europe whose role is 'to judge that States party are in conformity in law and in practice with the provisions of the European Social Charter'. 53 The ILO has become increasingly critical of the Court of Justice over the years, condemning it, in particular, for its judgment in Viking and Laval 54 and the effect this is having on freedom of association, collective bargaining and the right to strike.
55
It has also been critical of the major reforms to Greek labour law as a condition of the bailout.
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Similarly, the ECSR has criticised the major reforms to Greek law and the various ways they have contravened the provisions of the ESC. 
How might the Charter apply?
Assuming the analysis above is correct and the Charter will eventually be considered to apply to acts taken by Member States as part of the conditionality of receiving a bailout, and to acts of the EU institutions taken under the TSCG, this raises the question as to what effect the Charter might have. In other words, how might the Court engage in a balancing exercise of competing rights (eg the freedom to conduct a business under Article 16 on the one hand, and the right to protection against unjustified dismissal under Article 30 and the right to fair and just working conditions under Article 31, on the other). Assuming the Court eventually recognises that its attempts to avoid answering the questions are unsatisfactory both legally and politically, there seems to be two possible routes for it to pursue.
The first possibility is for the Court to address the issue directly and substantively, perhaps wrapped in a 'margin of appreciation' cloak, and work out how to balance the competing interests between those inside work (but possibly losing their jobs) and those without work. The Court's case law on age discrimination might provide a template. A long line of case law broadly suggests that the Court is sensitive to arguments based on intergenerational fairness and creating opportunities for younger people to get into the employment market by removing older workers. 58 The EU2020 strategy also appears to mandate precedence to those out of work: the third strand, inclusive growth, is about ensuring 'at least 20 million fewer people [are] in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion'. One of the two flagship initiatives under this strand is guaranteeing 'respect for the fundamental rights of people experiencing poverty and social exclusion, and enabling them to live in dignity and take an active part in society mobilising support to help people integrate in the communities where they live, get training and help to find a job and have access to social benefits'. This might suggest that the Court will give priority to any measure which will facilitate job creation, even though as Armingeon and Baccaro have argued, there is little evidence that cutting labour standards does improve competitiveness.
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A second possibility, and my favoured solution, is to adopt a procedural approach. In essence this means verifying whether, in introducing the changes, the state, in accordance with its industrial relations tradition, has consulted the relevant parties, in particular the social partners, 60 in advance of taking the decision. Some support for a more procedural approach by the Court of Justice can be gleaned from Volker and Schecke. 61 As we saw above, the Court had to strike a 'proper balance' 62 between the interests of taxpayers, who had a right to be kept informed of the use of public funds, with the right to privacy of individuals in receipt of public money. It concluded that there was nothing to show that when adopting the legislation 'the Council and the Commission took into consideration methods of publishing information on the beneficiaries concerned which would be consistent with the objective of such publication while at the same time causing less interference with those beneficiaries' right to respect for their private life in general and to protection of their personal data in particular'. Because the institutions did not properly balance the competing interests 'the Council and the Commission exceeded the limits which compliance with the principle of proportionality imposes.' 63 Thus the problem was less the outcome of the balancing exercise than the method with which that balance was undertaken. Translating this into reviewing reforms of national labour law for their compatibility with the Charter, the role of the Court would be to check that the state has engaged in appropriate discussions with interested parties prior to deciding on the reforms necessary. There is some evidence in the case of Portugal that this is already so. In its Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding with the IMF, the Portuguese government says:
64
Reforms in labour and social security legislation will be implemented after consultation with social partners, taking into account possible constitutional implications, and in respect of EU Directives and Core Labour Standards.
Thus, Portugal has demonstrated an awareness that it needs to go through the correct procedures and check that its reforms are still compatible with EU and (ILO?) core labour standards. Furthermore, the proposed Regulation on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the euro area (one of the so-called 'two pack') expressly provides in Article 6a:
65
The Member State concerned shall seek the views of social partners as well as relevant civil society organisations when preparing a draft macroeconomic adjustment programme, with a view to contributing to building consensus over content.
In other words the effect of any procedural approach would be to force the states to undertake an ex ante consultation process and an ex ante review but allowing the Member States to choose their own reforms so long as they do not undermine the 'essence' 66 of, say, the right to unjustified dismissal or fair and just working conditions. Yes, there is a risk to this exercise becoming merely a 'filing-cabinet' exercise, prompting a politically correct paper trail. But the Court would surely be wise to this. As we have seen, ex ante control is very much the vogue in the EU as far as human rights are concerned; 67 an approach by the Court towards encouraging this would seem a promising way forward.
D. Conclusions
The birth of children transforms their parents' lives forever; no longer can they go back to the freespirited pre-children days. The same is likely to be true of the Charter: it has transformed the EU's landscape forever and the EU will (hopefully) never go back to pre-Charter, pre-human rights days when the EU was a glorified trading area. As this paper has shown, the Charter has already proved legally significant in important areas, such as asylum and citizenship; it has yet to bite in the most sensitive area of all -the consequences of the financial crisis. This failure is damaging to the long term legitimacy of the Union and undermines the Court's oft-expressed commitment to human rights. Human rights are universal and that includes those citizens whose countries are in receipt of a bail-out.
